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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TAXATION OF CONTRABAND
AND EXPANSION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994)
Charles H. Davis***
Respondents, the first target' of a new Dangerous Drug Tax Act,2 were
assessed a tax pursuant to the Act. Respondents filed Bankruptcy, and
Petitioner filed a Proof of Claim for the amount of the tax.4 The bankruptcy
court denied the claim, discharged the debt, and ruled that the assessments
were "arbitrary and capricious" and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Petitioner appealed, and the U.S. District Court affirmed, finding that the tax
had punished Respondents twice for the same act.6 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, declining to hold the tax unconstitutional
on its face and ruling instead that Petitioner had failed to provide a
particularized assessment of the penalty and its purpose.7 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari, affirmed the decision of the circuit court, and HELD
Petitioner's drug tax was a second punishment and the proceeding initiated
to collect the tax placed Respondents in jeopardy a second time.'

* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Spring, 1995.
** To my wife Sharon and my children Arielle, Micah, and Jonathan who sustained me
in the effort with love and encouragement.
1. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1942-43 (1994).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111 (1993). "[E]ach person possessing or storing
dangerous drugs is liable for the tax." Id.
3. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942-43 n. 10. The tax with penalties and interest totaled
$894,940.99. Id. The Kurth family raised grain and livestock on their central Montana farm
until 1986, when they began to raise and market marijuana and derivatives of it. Id. at 1942.
At the time of their arrest the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax had just gone into effect. Id.
After the arrest, the drugs were inventoried and destroyed. Id. at 1948. The Kurths were
prosecuted for conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell. Id. at 1942. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (1987). Richard and Judith Kurth were sentenced to prison while the
other convicted family members received suspended or deferred sentences. Kurth Ranch, 114
S. Ct. at 1942.
4. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1943. A total of $864,940.99 reflected a $30,000 payment
by respondents. Id. Respondents also were the subject of an action for civil forfeiture in
which they agreed to turn over some of their equipment and $18,016.83 in cash. Id. at 1942.
5. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. 61, 74-76 (Bankr. Mont. 1990).
6. In re Kurth Ranch, 1991 WL 365065, at *3 (D. Mont. 1991).
7. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1993).
8. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
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The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
a criminal defendant protection from twice being placed in "jeopardy of life
or limb" for the same offense.' Though this constitutional guarantee has
existed since antiquity' and is thoroughly developed in United States case
law," Double Jeopardy remains a source of misunderstanding and frequent
litigation.'2
While the Supreme Court has repeatedly outlined three
purposes served by the Double Jeopardy Clause, 3 the cases involved are of
only two types. Double Jeopardy results from either two prosecutions for the
same offense or two punishments for the same offense. 4 Nevertheless, the
two types are often confused.
During the late nineteenth century, a line of cases held that all second
prosecutions and second punishments were forbidden, whether civil or
criminal. 5 In Helvering v. Mitchell,'6 the Court departed from these
decisions to permit a civil proceeding and the exaction of a civil fine to
follow a criminal prosecution." 7 In Mitchell, the defendant was charged
with a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax by fraudulently taking a
deduction" for a loss in violation of the Revenue Act of 1928.19 After the
defendant was acquitted, the Director of Internal Revenue assessed an amount
equal to the unpaid tax plus fifty percent.2" The Mitchell Court held that

9. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
10. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699-700 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Historians attribute an early reference to Double Jeopardy to the ancient Greek orator Demosthenes. See id.
11. See ex parte Lange, 18 U.S. (Wall.) 163, 168 (1874); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
12. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 699-700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440. A defendant is protected from "a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. (citations omitted).
14. Elizabeth S. Jahncke, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double
Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112, 115 (1991).
15. Andrew Z. Glickman, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the
Multiple Punishment Doctrine to ParallelProceedingsAfter United States v. Halper, 76 VA.
L. REv. 1251, 1255-56 (1990); see United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 357-58 (1984) (citing Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886)). When the
U.S. Constitution was framed, it was common for legislation to provide a criminal proceeding
and a civil proceeding, each imposing sanctions for the same conduct. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 555 (1943).
16. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
17. Id. at 397.
18. Id. at 395. The deduction totalled $2,872,305.50, resulting in an underpayment of
$728,709.84 in federal income taxes. Id.
19. Id. at 392.
20. Id. at 395. The Court in Mitchell ruled the subsequent civil action was not precluded
under res judicata. Id. at 397. Failure to prove willful avoidance of payment beyond a
reasonable doubt was not proof that Mitchell did not willfully attempt to avoid the tax. Id.
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acquittal on a criminal charge did not bar a civil action by the Government,
even though based on the same facts, as long as the Government was seeking
a remedy.2"
The Court in Mitchell reasoned that Congress could impose a civil
sanction and a criminal penalty for the same act.22 The Court reasoned that
the prohibition in the Double Jeopardy Clause applied only to a second
criminal punishment.2 ' Therefore, the Mitchell Court developed a "statutory
construction" test for determining whether a second prosecution could be
characterized as civil and thus be permissible. 24 The Court ruled that the
character of the sanction would properly be determined by construction of the
statute authorizing the sanction. 25 The Mitchell statutory construction test
limited the application of Double Jeopardy to successive criminal penalties
as determined from the underlying statute.26
The rule of statutory construction espoused in Mitchell was reaffirmed
and extended in Marcus v. Hess.27 In Hess, Respondents conspired to rig
bids on government contracts in a pattern of collusion that resulted in higher
prices for those contracts. 2' Respondents pled nolo contendere 29 to charges
of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government and were subject to penalties
including a fine and imprisonment. 0
In a subsequent civil qui tam
3
action 1 arising from the same acts of fraud, the district court exacted
double damages and civil forfeitures from Respondents.32
Because Hess applied to a second prosecution following a conviction, the
decision necessarily involved the evaluation of a second penalty.33 The
Hess Court applied Mitchell and indicated it needed only to determine, by
looking at the statute, whether the second sanction imposed was a criminal
21. 1d. at 397.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 399.
25. Id.
26. See Glickman, supra note 15, at 1255. When considering whether civil sanctions
could be treated as criminal penalties, the Mitchell test became the basis on which
determinations were made. Id.
27. 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943).
28. Id. at 540 n.1.
29. Nolo contendere is a plea by which a defendant waives the right to a trial and permits
the court to sentence the defendant as if guilty, yet the defendant does not admit guilt. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 (1970).
30. Hess, 317 U.S. at 546, 548.
31. A qui tam action permits a private party to bring a civil action against a party on
behalf of the United States Government. See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionalityof Qui
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 (1989). Proceeds from any judgment obtained are
divided between the private plaintiff and the Government. Id.
32. Hess, 317 U.S. at 540. The Government exacted a $2000 forfeiture for each of 56
violations ($112,000) and a $203,000 civil fine, for a total of $315,000. Id.
33. Id. at 540, 548.
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penalty. 34 The Court then construed the statute as having amply provided
for a civil remedy as well as a criminal punishment and ruled the criminal
action was not intended to provide compensation to the Government. 35 The
purpose of the second action, in the judgment of the Court, was to seek a
remedy. 36 The Court therefore determined that the payment required was
a civil sanction. 37 Assured of the remedial nature of the second proceeding
and the validity of the Government's injury, the Court ruled that the damages
awarded gave Petitioner no more than was due. 3' After characterizing the
successive proceeding and the sanction as civil, the Hess Court followed
39
Mitchell to reach the conclusion that Double Jeopardy did not apply.

In a concurring opinion in Hess, Justice Frankfurter described the
statutory construction test as reasoning "too subtle" and ill-equipped to
protect the "humane interests" insured by the Double Jeopardy Clause.4 °
Justice Frankfurter noted the uncertainty that would result from allowing the
decision to employ such an important protection to turn on an issue
amounting only to terminology.4' He also urged that a defendant invoking
a Double Jeopardy claim ought to be allowed to prove that the imposed civil
42
sanction exceeded compensation for the Government's actual damages.
In United States v. Halper,43 the Court departed 44 from the Mitchell
test to endorse Justice Frankfurter's reasoning from Hess and established a

34. Id. at 549.
35. Id. at 548-49.
36. Id. at 549. In the reasoning of the Court, it was sufficient to rule the second action
was "remedial" and the second sanction was "civil." Id.
37. Id. The Court in Hess reasoned that the Government's right to contract and to possess
property was limited if it did not include the right to a protective remedy. Id. at 550 (quoting
Cotton v. United States, 11 U.S. (How.) 229, 231 (1850)). The power of the U.S. government
to deal with crime is not to be confused with the rights of the government as a political body.
Id. Allowing the government the powers to contract and to own property, while withholding
the power to protect those rights with a remedy, is anomalous. Id. Eventually, application
of the Mitchell test to preclude Double Jeopardy would not depend on injury to the
government, however. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 150, 152-53 (1956).
In Rex Trailer, a successive civil penalty was not precluded by Double Jeopardy even though
there was no showing on the record of any appreciable injury to the Government. Id.
38. Hess, 317 U.S. at 549 (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401 (remedy only affords the
government complete indemnity for its injuries)). The Hess Court noted it had approved state
statutes that provided "double or treble or even quadruple damages." Id. at 550-51 (citing
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885)).
39. Id. at 549.
40. Id. at 554 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
44. See Glickman, supranote 15, at 1263 (discounting the Court's claim to have faithfully
followed precedent and noting that the Halper opinion was, indeed, a "significant departure").
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new test for multiple punishment cases.45 In Halper, Respondent was
convicted of submitting sixty-five false claims to Medicare and fraudulently
collecting a total of $585 on those claims.4 6 After Respondent was
convicted, the Government brought a separate civil action under the False
Claims Act.47 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed4 8 the trial court's conclusion that $130,000 in damages, the amount sought by the Government, lacked
"rational relation" to the costs incurred. 9 In a unanimous opinion, ° the
Court held that a defendant can be the subject of a successive civil sanction
only to the extent the sanction is remedial and not retributive."
By means of the "rational relation" test, the Halper Court re-examined
the circumstances in which a civil penalty could be characterized as
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 To be termed a remedy,
the civil fine must bear a rational relation to the Government's injury. 3 In
Halper, the Court looked beyond the statutory interpretation test 4 to
evaluate the characteristics of sanctions as they were imposed on the
individual by the state.55 Halper abandoned the Mitchell test 6 by asserting
that a statutorily calculated civil remedy in a civil proceeding may be "so
extreme" that it could only be classified as punishment.
Diminishing the
importance of the terms "civil" and "criminal," the Court focused on the
underlying proceeding and stressed evaluation of the purposes actually served

45. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. The question was whether the penalty provided in the
statute constituted a second punishment for Double Jeopardy analysis. Id.
46. Id. at 437.
47. Id. at 438-39 (citing United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)). The U.S. District Court granted a Government motion for summary judgment, but in
its discretion, awarded $2,000 per count (the statutory amount) for only eight of the counts
($16,000), instead of for all 65 counts ($130,000). Id.
48. Id. at 440. Direct appeal was taken from the district court to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Id.

49. Id. at 439 (quoting Halper,660 F. Supp. at 534).
50. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion discussing the limits of the holding. See
id. at 452.
51. Id. at 448-49.
52. Id. at 446.
53. See id. at 439.

54. Id. at 447. Statutory interpretation is appropriately used to identify the nature of an
underlying proceeding or to determine which constitutional protections must attach in those
proceedings. Id.
55. Id. at 447 n.7. The determination whether a civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment is accomplished by an evaluation of the purposes actually served by the sanction.
Id. It is not the underlying nature of the proceeding imposing the sanction that must be
evaluated. Id.
56. The Halper Court described interpretation of the statute as only generally useful for
identification of the underlying proceeding. Id. at 447.
57. Id. at 442.
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by the sanction."8 In this way, the Court in Halper viewed Double Jeopardy
as "intrinsically personal."59 Narrowing the holding, however, the Court
limited Halperto a "rule for the rare case," for the "prolific but small-gauge
offender," who is punished disproportionately by a fixed-penalty provision.'
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed whether an
exaction in a successive proceeding could be characterized as punitive and
made subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6' Specifically, the instant
Court determined whether a tax could be such a penalty.62 The Court noted
that, although a tax cannot be valid if it compels self-incrimination, the
taxation of criminal activity, generally, is not forbidden.63 Nevertheless, a
tax can be punitive,' and a tax which is found to be a penalty could violate
Double Jeopardy.65
The Court reaffirmed the personal nature of the
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause while it considered the
protection's applicability to a tax.'
The Court found the tax in the instant case to be "remarkably high" and
that it was intended to deter drug possession.67 These factors were
determined to be consistent with the characterization of the tax as a
penalty. The Court further considered that the assessment of the tax only
followed the commission of a crime and that only criminals would be
numbered among those paying the tax.69 Additionally, the Court found that
because the drugs were destroyed after Respondents were arrested, the tax
was assessed on property no longer in the possession of the taxpayer.7"
These combined aspects compelled the Court to conclude the tax was a
"concoction of anomalies," rightly characterized as a punishment and subject

58. Id.at 442, 447 n.7. This evaluation is not to be made from the defendant's
perspective, from which "even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment." Id. at 447
n.7 (citing Hess, 317 U.S. at 551).
59. Id. at 447. This description proceeds from a discussion of Double Jeopardy as a
protection of "humane interests" derived from the concurrence in Hess. Id. (citing Hess, 317
U.S. at 554 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Halper Court left to trial courts the individual
accounting required for proper application of the protection. Id. at 450.
60. Id. at 449.
61. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945.
62. Id. at 1941.
63. Id. at 1945 (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968)).
64. Id. at 1946 (citing Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934)).
65. Id. at 1945-46 (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 391).
66. Id. at 1946. Halper recognized that the constitutional protection was "intrinsically
personal" and that only the characteristics of the sanctions as they apply to the individual
defendant can substantiate a possible Double Jeopardy violation. See Halper,490 U.S. at 447.
67. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
68. Id. at 1946 n.17. A total of 1811 ounces of marijuana, with an estimated market value
of $46,000 was taxed at $181,000. Id.
69. Id. at 1947.
70. Id. at 1948.
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to invalidation as to Double Jeopardy.7 Because the tax was a penalty
assessed subsequent to a criminal conviction for the same offense, the instant
Court held that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.72
The instant Court did not rely on the rational relation test to reach its
result." The majority and three of the four Justices in dissent agreed it
would be inappropriate to apply the test to a tax. 4 Justice O'Connor,
writing alone in a separate dissent, however, found the tax in the instant case
to be constitutionally indistinguishable from a fine. 75 Noting the "vast
sums" expended to control drugs,76 Justice O'Connor employed the rational
relation test 77 and concluded that Respondents had not shown that the drug
tax did not meet it. 78 Justice O'Connor interpreted the test to require a twopart approach preceded by Respondent's entitlement to an accounting of the
Government's damages. 79 Respondent could have challenged that accounting by showing the lack of a rational relationship between the sanction
imposed and the Government's damages."
The Government then would
have had the burden of justifying the sanction in Respondent's case.8l
At first glance, the instant case seemed to provide the "rare case"
envisioned in Halper.2 Certainly, the question 83 in the instant case might

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see Halper, 490 U.S. at 441.
74. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948-49, 1958. Though the lower courts assumed the
instant case was controlled by Halper,by a margin of eight to one, the instant Court decided
that it was not. Id. at 1948. The majority and three dissenting Justices for different reasons
concluded that Double Jeopardy should not apply. See id. at 1948-49, 1958. Chief Justice
Rehnquist was unwilling to apply any Double Jeopardy analysis to a tax. Id. at 1949. Justices
Scalia and Thomas, seeing unintended consequences, were ready to abandon Halper
altogether. Id. at 1958.
75. Id. at 1953.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1954.
78. Id. at 1955. Justice O'Connor urged remand to allow Respondents to make that
argument and to allow Petitioners to make a showing of rational relation. Id. The treatment
of the instant case below at every stage reveals it was assumed Respondents had made such
a claim and that Petitioners failed to carry their burden to refute it. See In re Kurth Ranch,
145 B.R. at 74; In re Kurth Ranch, 1991 WL 365065 at 3-4; In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at
1312.
79. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1954.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1943-44. The Bankruptcy court relied on Halper,after assuming a showing
that the tax was disproportionate, and ruled it was a penalty. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at
74. The Ninth Circuit Court applied Halper to show that any "labels affixed" were
inconclusive and that the word "tax" was "not dispositive." In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d at
1310.
83. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941. The question in the instant case was whether a tax
on illegal drug possession, imposed after criminal conviction and sentencing, is a successive
punishment. Id.
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have been answered by the majority using the rational relation test.' In so
doing, the Court could have succeeded in clarifying and solidifying an
obscure and amorphous area of constitutional law. 85 Instead, the Court,
once unanimous in this area, 6 fragmented itself and retreated from the bold
but clear path it had embarked on in Halper.s7
Undeniably, the Court may have had some difficulty treating the instant
case as if Halper was controlling. 8 Although the tax was statutorily
imposed and Respondents were "prolific," they were hardly "small-gauge offenders. 8 9 Nevertheless, the readiness of the majority to recognize an
incongruity between the value of the marijuana seized and the size of the
assessment9" attests to the facility9' and applicability of the Halper test.92
Moreover, notwithstanding the instant Court's ultimate refusal to employ the
rational relation test, a thorough analysis of Halper comprised a significant
portion of the opinion.9 3 Indeed, the majority indulged in a limited
invocation of Halper that nearly rose to the level of following it as
precedent.94 The instant Court used Halper for the essential elements of its
reasoning, and that reasoning was, ultimately, not appreciably different from
Halper.95 Furthermore, to the extent it departed from Halperand attempted
to justify the instant result without the rational relation test, the instant
Court's reasoning was weakened.9 6

84. See id. at 1953-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Under the Halper test: (1) "readily
available statistics" show the cost of detecting, investigating, and prosecuting drug cases; (2)
approximations of a defendant's appropriate contribution should suffice because an exact
measurement for each defendant would be too complex; therefore, (3) the tax has a rational
relation to the goal of compensating the government. Id.
85. See id. at 1945 n.15.
86. See Halper,490 U.S. 435.
87. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). Justice Rehnquist described
Double Jeopardy jurisprudence as a "veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge
the most intrepid judicial navigator." Id.; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 699 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
But see Jahncke, supra note 14, at 115 n.33 (criticizing the Halperdecision for continuing the
"confused legacy of Double Jeopardy law by conflating the two protections").
88. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1952 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. See id. In fact, Respondents may have been the largest marijuana producer in the
state. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 66; see Halper,490 U.S. at 449; see also Kurth Ranch,
114 S.Ct. at 1942 n.7 (itemizing inventory of contraband seized at time of Respondents'
arrest).
90. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.Ct. at 1943-44. The lower courts noted the disparity and readily
employed Halper. See id.
91. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127, 129 (1980) (application of
Double Jeopardy neither facile nor routine).
92. See Kurth Ranch, 114 U.S. at 1943-44.
93. Id. at 1944-45.
94. See id. at 1946-48.

95. See id.
96. See id. at 1949 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). The Chief Justice accused the Court of
going "astray" and employing "rejected criteria." Id.
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The Court relied on Halper for propositions that the term "tax" is not
dispositive in the instant case and that labels are not conclusive in a Double
Jeopardy analysis. 97 At the same time, the Court asserted that Halper did
not apply to a tax. 98 Consistent with their unwillingness to apply the
rational relation test to a tax, the instant Court considered it improper even
to permit the state to show that the assessment was approximately equal to
its costs. 99 On the other hand, the Court noted that the state's formula for
the assessment was computed without reference to the state's harm. 00 This
finding was followed immediately by the conclusion that the tax was not
remedial and thus was a second punishment.' 0 ' This essentially amounted
to an employment of the rational relation test without properly ascribing the
authority for it to its source.012
The instant Court also relied on Halper to support its individualized
evaluation013 of the particular application of the tax and characterized it as
punitive." ° This reasoning, straight from Halper,10 5 led to the ultimate
conclusion that the tax was, in fact, a penalty and precluded by Double
Jeopardy. 10 6 Again, the Court was apparently controlled by Halper without
announcing it. 10 7 In the instant case, evaluation of the drug tax under
Halper could have proceeded along comparable lines to the same result, but
with far-reaching benefit to Double Jeopardy jurisprudence. Had it done so,
the instant Court would not have been compelled to engage in its disingenuous reasoning.'l '
A straightforward application of Halper in the instant case would have
eliminated the need for the other elements of the Court's argument which are
of questionable merit." °9 The instant Court employed a logical fallacy to
determine that, because its imposition was conditioned on a crime, the
exaction could not be a tax." ° The Court also challenged the assessment
as a tax on goods after "confiscation."'
The instant Court mused that a

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1948.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Halper,490 U.S. at 447-48.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
Id.

105. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 439-40. This reasoning derives from Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Hess. Id. at 439; see Hess, 317 U.S. at 554.
106. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
107. See id. at 1948.

108. See id.
109. See id. at 1948-49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 1947 n.20 (citing United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950)). If -C then
T; C; therefore -T: This fallacy is termed "denying the antecedent."
II1. Id.at 1948.
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tax on confiscated goods is "at least questionable" because a confiscatory
statute is unconstitutional.'
The Court thus implied that an evidentiary
seizure of contraband pursuant to arrest is unconstitutionally confiscatory." 3
A purposeful employment of Halper in the instant case would have avoided
both a formless, confusing rationale and the divergent results almost certain
14
to follow in the lower courts.
After Mitchell, subsequent civil sanctions, fines, taxes, and seizures were
limited only by the Eighth Amendment" 5 and by construction of an
underlying statute as having imposed a criminal penalty. 1 6 The Halper
Court, realizing Justice Frankfurter's vision in Hess, demanded a rational
relation between the damages and the injury.1"' In the instant case, society
would have benefited by a broadening of the rational relation test."' The
Court should have expanded the test not just to include a tax assessment but
to extend to the universe of Double Jeopardy cases." 9
Fears of unintended consequences 2 should have been allayed by
Justice O'Connor's dissent in the instant case.' 2 ' The two-step process she
described would have assured a fair application in the instant case of the
"personal" protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 22 By
applying Halper,the instant Court could have consolidated Double Jeopardy
23
analysis in the same way the Hess Court did by applying Mitchell.
Seeing the instant case as a parallel to Halper would have taken the case-bycase evaluation of sanctions and the rational relation test from successive
punishment after conviction to successive prosecution. 24 The instant Court

112. Id.(citing Heiner v. Donan, 285 U.S. 312, 326 (1932); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S.
531 (1927)).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1944, 1958.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (stating
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to successive proceedings).
116. See Glickman, supra note 15, at 1258; Jahncke, supra note 14, at 126, 143.
117. Halper,490 U.S. at 452.

118. But see Glickman, supra note 15, at 1268 (asserting that a narrow application of
Halper was intended).
119. But see id. at 1265-66 (warning Halper would create "havoc").
120. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expecting "further enigmas"
because of Halper); see Glickman, supra note 15, at 1267-68.
121. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1952-55 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (reaching an
opposite result following Halper).
122. See id. at 1954-55.
123. See Jahncke, supra note 14, at 124-25; Glickman, supra note 15, at 1258. The Hess
Court applied the test from Mitchell, a successive prosecution case after acquittal, to
successive punishment cases after conviction. See id.
124. By its own terms, Halper did not address successive prosecution, though it surely
could have, as effectively as in the instant case. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. The civil False

Claims suit in Halper was as much a successive prosecution as a motion in the voluntary
bankruptcy proceeding in the instant case. See In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B.R. at 74-76.
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could have taken this step explicitly and reduced the impact of the ambiguity
that results from the several ways these terms are employed.'2 5
The Court's stated motivation for granting certiorari in the instant case
was to reconcile disparate conclusions between the Ninth Circuit and a state
supreme court, regarding Halper.126 The instant case hardly seems to have
reconciled anything. Far from settling Double Jeopardy issues, the instant
case goes a long way toward upsetting them. Explicitly following Halper
would have left lower courts with a clearer picture of the rational relation test
and greater certainty in an area chronically plagued by confusion.'27 The
Court denied that the instant case was controlled by Halper, yet employed a
nearly identical, but inferior, pattern of reasoning. In the wake of the instant
decision, lower courts retain only the diffused authority of the Halper test
with increased uncertainty as to when it applies. Society is ill-served by such
obfuscation in an area of constitutional law that needs an infusion of clear
direction.

125. See Jahncke, supra note 14, at 115 n.33.
126. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1944.
127. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343 (Double Jeopardy jurisprudence, a "veritable Sargasso
Sea"); see also Jahncke, supra note 14, at 114 (describing the legacy of Double Jeopardy law
as "confused").

